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Recent Cases
FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION
CONSENT ORDER
DOES NOT PREEMPT
NEW YORK LEMON
LAW
In General Motors Corporation v.
Robert Abrams, Attorney General of
the State of New York, 897 F.2d 34
(2d Cir. 1990), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a consent order
between General Motors Corporation ("GM") and the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") that
provided for arbitration of warranty disputes did not insulate GM
from the additional requirements
of the New York New Car Lemon
Law ("Lemon Law"). N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law § 198-a. The court held
that a consent order, like any other
federal law, has the authority to
preempt state laws if the federal
agency intended the consent order
to bar state regulation in that particular area. The court concluded,
however, that because the FTC did
not intend its Consent Order with
GM to bar additional state regulation in the area of automobile
warranties and related arbitration
procedures, the Order did not preempt the Lemon Law requirements.
Background
In 1980, the FTC issued a complaint against GM for failing to
notify its customers that certain
GM cars and light trucks had defective engines and transmissions.
The FTC entered a Consent Order
with GM in 1983 after extensive
negotiations and public comment.
The Consent Order required GM
to implement a nationwide arbitration program, administered by the
Better Business Bureau, for customers who believed they had purchased defective automobiles. The
program was voluntary for the customer and the arbitrator's decision
bound only GM. Thus, the custom-

er could choose between arbitration and going directly to court
without arbitration. If the consumer chose arbitration and was unhappy with the results, the consumer still could bring the case to
court. On the other hand, if GM
was unhappy with the arbitrator's
decision, it was bound by the result. The Consent Order also required that the arbitrators be untrained in arbitration procedures,
be drawn from all segments of the
community, and base their decisions on common sense assessments of what is fair and equitable
given the facts of the case. However, the arbitrator's decision could
never contradict state law.
In 1983, the New York legislature enacted the Lemon Law.
The Lemon Law required automobile manufacturers to repair items
covered by express warranties, free
of charge, for a period of two years
or 18,000 miles. If the new car was
not repaired after four attempts or
if the car was out for service for a
cumulative total of thirty or more
days, it was considered a "lemon"
and the owner was entitled to a full
refund or a replacement vehicle.
However, if the manufacturer had
an arbitration program, the consumer was required to participate
in that program in order to qualify
for Lemon Law protection. In
1986, the Lemon Law was amended to require that arbitrators be
trained in arbitration procedures,
be familiar with the Lemon Law
provisions, and that the arbitrators
apply Lemon Law standards and
remedies when arbitrating under
the manufacturer's program. The
amendment also created an alternative arbitration program administered by the New York Attorney
General and staffed with professional arbitrators. The arbitrators
in this alternative program were to
apply the Lemon Law standards
and remedies.
GM sued the New York Attorney General in the United States
District Court for the Southern
District of New York, seeking a

declaratory judgment that certain
provisions of the Lemon Law were
preempted by the GM-FTC Consent Order. GM contended that the
FTC would not have negotiated a
detailed settlement after taking
public comment if the FTC had
intended to permit additional state
regulation. GM also argued that it
was impossible to comply with
both the Consent Order and the
Lemon Law, and that the state
Lemon Law frustrated the FTC's
efforts to create a uniform nationwide arbitration program for GM's
customers. Therefore, GM contended, the Consent Order preempted New York's Lemon Law.
The New York Attorney General countered that only a federal
agency's regulations and not its
settlement agreements should preempt state law because settlements
did not have the administrative
safeguards of regulations. Alternatively, even if a consent order
could preempt state law, the FTC
did not intend that the Consent
Order preempt the New York Lemon Law.
The district court granted GM's
motion for summary judgment and
held that the GM-FTC Consent
Order preempted the Lemon Law.
The New York Attorney General
appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
Federal Consent Orders May
Preempt State Laws
Whether a federal agency's consent order had the preemptive authority of other federal laws was an
issue of first impression for the
Second Circuit. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution, federal laws preempt
state laws where the two are in
conflict. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
The United States Supreme Court
held in Louisiana Public Service
Commission v. F.C.C., 476 U.S.
355, 369 (1986), that federal agencies acting within the scope of their
congressionally-delegated authority may preempt state laws. Federal
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courts will uphold agency action
intended to preempt state law if the
agency was acting reasonably and
within its congressionally delegated authority.
The court held that the FTC had
the congressional authority to settle cases through consent orders.
The court further held that the
FTC-GM Consent Order was reasonable both because it avoided
risky and expensive litigation and
because it resulted from extensive
negotiations and public comment.
The court concluded that such a
consent order may preempt state
laws. However, the court noted
that although a consent order may
preempt state law, it will do so only
if the consent order was intended
to bar state regulation.
Intent to Preempt
The court next turned to the
issue of whether the FTC intended
its Consent Order with GM to
preempt additional state regulation in this area. Absent an express
intent to preempt state regulation,
intent may be implied in two ways:
(1) if federal regulation of a particular field is so comprehensive that
it is reasonable to infer that the
federal authority intended to exclude state regulation; and (2) if a
conflict exists between the federal
and state laws such that it is impossible to comply with both laws, or
if complying with the state law
frustrates the objectives of the federal law.
The court rejected GM's argument that the Consent Order was
so comprehensive that the FTC
intended to occupy the field of
GM's warranty disputes to the
exclusion of state regulations. The
court stated that because states
traditionally have regulated consumer protection, GM had to show
compelling evidence that the FTC
intended to preempt state regulation. The FTC-GM Consent Order
alone did not show a clear purpose
to exclude state regulation of automobile warranties. The Consent
Order itself contained references to
state law. Also, if GM was not
bound by state law, it would have
an unfair advantage over its competitors, who would have to follow
the state law. The court concluded
that the FTC Consent Order
Volume 2, Number 4/Summer, 1990
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The L~ ~
Layman and lawyer alike
who are unfamiliar with this
area of law should read the new
edition of the user-friendly
Lemon Book, written by consumer advocate Ralph Nader
and the Center for Auto Safety's Executive Director Clarence Ditlow. The book details
what a consumer can do to
avoid getting a lemon when
buying a car. The book tells
consumers who have bought
lemons how to discover their
rights, lodge complaints with
manufacturers, and prepare

for arbitration or litigation.
Moreover, the book advises
consumers how to organize

grassroots consumer groups to
combat manufacturer abuses.
The Lemon Book is avail-

able at book stores for $12.95
and from the publisher by
sending $15.95 (includes postage and handling) to:

Moyer-Bell
Colonial Hill RFD 1
Mt. Kiosco, N.Y. 10549
or by calling:
1-800-759-4100.
should not insulate GM from the
New York Lemon Law.
Voluntary Participation in
Arbitration
The court next considered GM's
argument that the Consent Order
and the Lemon Law conflicted.
GM argued that, unless the Consent Order preempted the Lemon
Law, the Lemon Law provision
requiring participation in the manufacturer's arbitration program
prior to court action would eliminate the voluntary arbitration created by the Consent Order. The
court interpreted the Lemon Law
differently. Rather than requiring
that the consumer arbitrate, the
Lemon Law restricted Lemon Law
suits to those consumers who first
had attempted to arbitrate the dispute. Consumers could bypass arbitration, but they could only sue

on a cause of action other than the
Lemon Law. Thus, the court concluded that the Lemon Law's exhaustion requirement did not conflict with the voluntary aspect of
the Consent Order arbitration.
Other State and Federal
Requirements Not InConflict
GM contended that a conflict
existed in that whereas the Consent
Order directed arbitrators to decide cases according to a common
sense assessment of what was fair
and equitable, the Lemon Law
required arbitrators to apply the
specific standards and remedies of
the Lemon -Law. The court recognized that an arbitrator using a
"fair and equitable" standard
might not decide a case the same
way as an arbitrator applying the
Lemon Law standards. The court
concluded, however, that the possible difference in results did not
make the two laws incompatible.
Moreover, the Lemon Law's specific standards and remedies applied only to cars that were considered "lemons." Where a vehicle
did not meet the statuary definition of "lemon," an arbitrator was
free to apply the "fair and equitable standard" under both the Lemon Law and the Consent Order.
Therefore, the Lemon Law standards did not conflict with the
Consent Order standards.
The court also rejected GM's
argument that the New York law's
requirement of trained arbitrators
familiar with the Lemon Law made
the two laws incompatible. The
court reasoned that the Consent
Order directed that the arbitrators
be non-professional arbitrators.
Nothing in the Lemon Law required professional arbitrators.
Finally, GM argued that the
Lemon Law was preempted because it disrupted the goal of the
Consent Order to provide nationwide uniformity. The court held
that although the Consent Order
was intended to create a nationwide system of arbitration between
GM and its disgruntled customers,
the Order did not require national
uniformity. Nor was national uniformity necessary to achieve the
goals of the Consent Order. For all
these reasons, the court held that
(continued on page 114)
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the Consent Order did not preempt
New York's Lemon Law.
Dissenting Opinion
The dissent noted that under the
Lemon Law the consumer was required to participate in the manufacturer's arbitration procedure,
if any existed. Thus, the Lemon
Law conflicted with the Consent
Order because the Lemon Law
made mandatory the arbitration
established as voluntary under the
Order. Moreover, according to the
dissent, the Better Business Bureau
not only trained its arbitrators to
reach a common sense decision,
but also specifically directed them
not to apply the substantive law of
any particular jurisdiction. Because New York's Lemon Law
required arbitrators to apply Lemon Law standards, it was in conflict
with the FTC-GM Consent Order.
The dissent concluded that this
conflict required a holding that the
Order preempted the Lemon Law.
Sean J. Hardy

HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY'S
COMPARATIVE
ADVERTISING
CAMPAIGN NOT
ENTITLED TO
HEIGHTENED
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION
In U.S. Healthcarev. Blue CrossBlue Shield of GreaterPhiladelphia,
898 F. 2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that allegedly defamatory, scare-tactic, multimedia health care advertising was
commercial speech and therefore
was not entitled to heightened protection under the first amendment
to the United States Constitution.
Moreover, although both parties
had invited controversy and had
the means to respond to the other's
advertising, neither was considered a "public figure" and thereI I4AVolume

fore the advertising did not warrant heightened constitutional
protection.
Background: A Comparative
Advertising War
For many years, Blue Cross of
Greater Philadelphia and Pennsylvania's Blue Shield ("Blue CrossBlue Shield") dominated the
health insurance industry in southeastern Pennsylvania; the company offered "traditional" medical
insurance coverage that allowed
the consumer to choose among
hospitals and physicians. A competitor, U.S. Healthcare, offered as
an alternative a health maintenance organization ("HMO"),
both as an insurer and as a direct
provider of medical services. An
HMO offers more comprehensive
services than traditional insurance,
but a primary health care provider
must determine when treatment is
necessary and from whom it may
be obtained. In just over ten years,
U.S. Healthcare grew to 600,000
members; Blue Cross-Blue Shield
membership dropped by over 1%
each year. A majority of those
leaving Blue Cross-Blue Shield
opted for U.S. Healthcare.
Faced with this loss of enrollment, Blue Cross-Blue Shield engaged in an aggressive, $2.175 million multi-media advertising
campaign. In print, radio, television, and direct mail advertisements, Blue Cross-Blue Shield
touted its Personal Choice program and attempted to make less
attractive the HMO option. For
example, several printed advertisements emphasized that a Personal
Choice patient may see a specialist
upon demand, but that an HMO
physician has a disincentive to
make such referrals because "it
could take money directly out of
his pocket."
Most of the Blue Cross-Blue
Shield advertisements contrasted
the features of Personal Choice
and the HMO plan and emphasized that HMO patients had fewer
choices with regard to physicians
and hospitals. The majority of the
advertisements were innocuous.
One television spot, however,
seemed to suggest that HMO membership was an invitation to disas-

ter. The advertisement depicted a
grief-stricken woman stating, "The
hospital my HMO sent me to just
wasn't enough. It's my fault."
U.S. Healthcare responded
quickly by instituting its own aggressive $1.25 million multi-media
advertisement campaign. The advertisements took aim at the Blue
Cross-Blue Shield message that
HMOs sacrificed quality care for
greater profits and highlighted the
fact that Personal Choice doctors
had fewer admitting privileges
than HMO doctors. Two of the
printed advertisements contained
the following headlines, emphasizing that fewer hospitals were available to Personal Choice subscribers: "When It Comes To Being
Admitted To A Hospital, There's
Something Personal Choice May
Not Be Willing To Admit" and "If
You Really Look Into 'Personal
Choice,' You Might Have A Better
Name For It." One of the television commercials played funeral
music while showing a patient's
anguished family members standing around a hospital bed. While a
voice discussed Personal Choice's
various shortcomings, a pair of
hands pulled a sheet up over a
Personal Choice brochure resting
on the pillow of the hospital bed.
U.S. Healthcare called the advertisement "Critical Condition."
Within a week after Blue CrossBlue Shield initiated its advertising
campaign, U.S. Healthcare filed in
a Pennsylvania state court a lawsuit for commercial disparagement, defamation and tortious interference with contractual
relations. At a later date, U.S.
Healthcare re-filed its state claims
in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In the district court, the
health care organization added a
claim under section 43 (a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)
(1982), which creates a cause of
action for any false or misleading
representations of a product. Blue
Cross-Blue Shield filed a counterclaim on essentially the same theories of liability stated in U.S.
Healthcare's complaint.
After a fourteen day trial, the
jury was deadlocked on all issues of
liability and damages. The judge
declared a mistrial and, before
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